When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also show that the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article we include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observation and imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that may account for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country.
Introduction
When studying redistributive attitudes, in a departure from traditional economics, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness (Fong, Corneo (2001) shows that individuals in high-redistributive countries such as former West Germany exhibit a greater concern for fairness than individuals in low-redistributive countries such as the United States 1 . Furthermore, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) show that, after controlling for individual characteristics, immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to give signi…cant support to higher redistribution in their destination country.
Accordingly, the intensity of the concern for others appears to some degree to be culturally shaped at young ages and to stop changing after reaching adulthood 2 . Understanding the development of an agent's preferences when young and the role of the cultural context are then of great importance in explaining individual demands for redistribution, and hence the diversity 1 Twenge et al. (2007) explain for example that social exclusion elicits strong negative feelings that impair the capacity for empathic understanding of others, and as a result, decreases pro-social behaviour (see Gunther
Moore et al., 2012, and Will et al., 2015, for neuroimaging evidence). To that extent, it is to be expected, as found in Corneo (2001) , that fairness considerations are undermined in societies with high social exclusion (the poverty rate in 2013 was more than 17% in the United States compared with less than 10% in all the major euro area countries, except Italy ; OECD, 2017), and in turn that these countries do not promote redistributive policies …ghting social exclusion. Note that the poverty rate is the ratio of the number of people whose income falls below the poverty line taken as half the median household income of the total population. 2 Supporting this view, psychologists McCrae and Costa (1994) have shown that personality traits stop changing after age 30. See Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for a discussion.
in redistributive policies in democratic countries.
Following robust empirical evidence that fairness and culture are two important components of redistributive attitudes, in this article we propose a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the strength of the moral norm or concern for distributive justice. Through oblique socialization, taste is shaped by the observation, imitation 3 and internalization of cultural practices. More speci…cally, we argue that the observation during childhood of redistributive policies that are far from what would be perceived as fair results in a weakened concern for distributive justice.
To characterize the socialization process and the persistence of preferences over generations, deviating from the norm a¤ects preferences with a delay of one generation. The moral cost of not supporting fair taxation is reduced when observing how the previous generation has collectively failed to implement a fair institution. Said di¤erently, our mechanism states that being exposed to unfairness during youth reduces individual responsibility regarding moral duty.
As a …rst result of our mechanism for intergenerational and cultural transmission, assuming that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is higher than the level sel…shly preferred, we explain that immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country because they have a stronger concern for distributive justice. This result is also consistent with the …ndings of Corneo (2001 what is perceived as fair, the redistributive institution and the concern for fairness co-evolve and are self-reinforcing such that the cultural transmission process ends with the implementation of the high redistribution level. By contrast, if people are socialized in an environment that is too far from what is perceived as fair, then observation that the moral norm does not prevail in the society reduces individual responsibility regarding moral duty. In that case, the cultural transmission process ends with the implementation of the low redistribution level. At steady state, our model satisfyingly reproduces the fact that redistribution is higher in (continental)
Europe than in the United States while market income inequality appears lower in the former.
This paper belongs to several strands of literature. At the micro level, it is related …rst to the literature on the interaction between social norms and individual behavior, which stresses that the incentive to behave in a certain manner depends on the degree to which we see others acting in this way. For example, in the literature on crime (see Funk, 2005) , the strength of the social crime norm is measured by the moral costs that arise from committing a crime. Therefore, as is well established in this literature, if it is observed that many others are committing crimes, the remorse or guilt felt from breaking the social norm is weakened. (1981) to improve its main prediction that greater income inequality results in greater redistribution -a prediction that has only weak support in the data 6 .
By stressing the importance of the concern for fairness, our approach is most closely related to the seminal paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) . However, the mechanism we propose is structurally di¤erent. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005) , Americans are supposed to support only weak redistribution because they believe that market outcomes are fair, i.e. determined by hard work rather than luck 7 . Indeed, in their framework, as the after-tax return to e¤ort is expected to be high, they work hard and the market outcomes are e¤ectively fair 8 . In other words, in fairness are self-ful…lled. In contrast, in our approach, the di¤erences are sustained because the concern for fairness is endogenous and culturally shaped. The mechanism we propose provides then a new explanation for the huge and persistent di¤erence in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States based on the intergenerational and cultural transmission of the strength of the concern for fairnesss.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present in section 2 an endogenous mechanism for the formation of preferences based on oblique socialization. In section 3, based on this mechanism and assuming that the perception of the fair level of taxation is exogenous and unanimously shared in the population, we show that our model exhibits multiple stable stationary states consistent with the negative correlation between income inequality and redistribution encountered in the data. We also explain why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country. In section 4, we extend and verify the robustness of our results by considering endogenous and
heterogenous views of what is fair. We conclude brie ‡y in the last section.
The social determinants of preferences
To characterize the socialization process, we consider an overlapping generations model in which each individual lives two periods : childhood and adulthood. People are educated and socialized during childhood, and through this process they internalize the cultural practices that will in ‡uence their behavior when they become adults. As adults, they work and consume in order to maximize their utility. Adult individuals also vote on income redistribution in the beginning of the period. In this way, they take into account the distortive e¤ect of redistribution on work e¤ort, as in the seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
Inequity aversion
where e it denotes the person's chosen e¤ort, A i 0 his talent or ability and i his luck (or bad luck). It is assumed that fA i ; e it g are private information to agent i. i is assumed unknown before the income distribution and such that E 0 [ i ] = 0, A i and i being independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) across agents. In other words, when deciding his work e¤ort, an individual knows its return but can not know if he will be lucky or not. After the income distribution, i is assumed to be private information to agent i. We then associate any market income distribution at date t with a distribution perceived as fair by the population and with an optimal linear redistributive tax rate f 2 [0; 1] that would allow implementing the fair income distribution. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005) , this level of redistribution is obtained endogenously and is at the basis of the multiplicity of equilibria. In contrast, for the clarity of our purposes, we will consider …rst that the level of redistribution perceived as fair is exogenous and unanimously shared in the population. We will investigate the limits of these assumptions in section 4. We then consider an extended version of the Bolton-Ockenfels model (2000) of distributive preferences in specifying the utility function as follows :
where u it denotes the private utility from personal consumption and the work e¤ort, and ' t 0 the strength of the concern for fairness or inequity aversion that we assume was shaped during childhood. consumption is part of their parents'consumption, we then specify the private utility as follows :
Assuming as in Boldrin and
where c it denotes household consumption (one adult -one child) at date t. The quadratic disutility of e¤ort is for analytical simplicity. At each period t, the government redistributes the income according to a simple …scal scheme characterized by a ‡at-rate tax t and a lumpsum bene…t provided to all adults. Assuming a balanced budget, each adult faces the following budget constraint :
where y t denotes the mean income at date t.
Oblique socialization
To incorporate social forces into individual behavior, one privileged way is by considering the formation of agents' preferences 9 . Preferences are to some degree socially determined, so that agents internalize preferences that re ‡ect the cultural practices of the society that they inhabit. Through oblique socialization, young individuals internalize, by imitation and learning, preferences that will in ‡uence their behavior when they become adults, which will explain the persistence of the cultural practices.
Assume then that the distributive preferences of an individual youth at date t 1 are in ‡uenced by the observation of the social environment and its degree of fairness. Denoting by t 1 the e¤ective level of taxation at date t 1 while f is the level perceived as fair, we can characterize the social environment by the social distance to distributive justice
The higher S t 1 , the more unfair the redistributive system perceived by the population. As the e¤ective level of taxation t 1 results from a collective choice of the adults at date t 1 through voting, a signi…cant S t 1 reveals a low weight attached to the moral norm adherence and a failure in implementing fair taxation. This low weight is therefore transmitted to the young generation through observation and imitation. Having been exposed to unfairness during youth reduces the concern for fairness. Denoting ' t = (S t 1 ), we will then assume in the following In light of these preferences, in the following section we study the resulting individual demands for redistribution and the policy that will be implemented in a democracy.
Redistributive policies in democracies
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of individuals at each generation endowed with utilities (2) and characterized by their speci…c e¤ort e it , their speci…c talent A i and their speci…c luck i . As already mentioned, A i and i are i.i.d across agents. The optimal e¤ort resulting from the maximization of the expected utility E 0t [U it ] is as follows :
As redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort, it reduces the e¤ort. In addition, as the return to e¤ort grows with ability, more talented individuals work harder. Considering eq. (6), the pre-tax income (1) of an adult at date t can be rewritten as :
where a i = A 2 i . As the level of e¤ort is reduced by redistribution, obviously the pre-tax income is also reduced.
The individual demands for redistribution
Consistently with our behavioral assumptions, an adult at date t will support the level of redistribution that maximizes his utility. Assuming that the vote occurs at the beginning of the period allows the person to take into account the distortive e¤ect of redistribution on work e¤ort and then on income. Accordingly, considering that he can fully anticipate his future e¤ort choice as a function of the tax rate, the expected utility (before knowing his particular luck) de…ned by eqs. (2) and (3) can be written, using eqs. (4), (6) and (7), as :
where a denotes the mean a i . De…ning the demand for redistribution of an individual as the level of taxation that maximizes his utility (8) leads then to the following …rst order condition
= 0. Therefore, as long as the second order condition a i 2 a 2' t 0 is satis…ed, knowing that ' t = (S t 1 ), individual demands for redistribution at date t can be expressed as :
Considering the second order condition, assuming max i fa i g 2 a is then a su¢ cient condition so that preferences are single-peaked in t .
Individual demands for redistribution as speci…ed in eq. (9) decrease with personal income,
0, and increase with the level of redistribution perceived as fair,
0. By exhibiting both sel…sh and fair motives, eq. (9) Eq. (9) also re ‡ects the fact that adults'demands for redistribution at date t are a¤ected by the cultural environment in which they have grown up. More speci…cally, if the level of redistribution perceived as fair by an individual of type i is higher than the level of redistribution he would have chosen under the sel…sh motive, then the degree of unfairness in the environment when young will lower his demand for redistribution :
Denote by a;t the demand for redistribution of an individual of talent a at date t, and would mean that less able immigrants, those whose levels of redistribution sel…shly preferred are above the fair level, from countries with a preference for greater redistribution would tend to support fewer redistribution compared to native individuals with the same talent. Indeed, as they have been exposed to less unfairness during their youth, their concern for fairness is stronger and they promote the fair level of redistribution that is less than the one sel…shly preferred. Assuming Two assumptions that have been made to obtain these results deserve attention. First, we assume that adult individuals vote on income redistribution in the beginning of the period, before deciding on their e¤ort. Otherwise, i.e. if individuals do not take into account the distortive e¤ect of redistribution on their work, it is well known that the sel…sh poorer-than-average individual (y it y t ) supports a full income redistribution because he anticipates earning more from redistribution ( t y t ) than he contributes ( t y it ). If the same poorer-than-average individual is purely fair (' t ! +1), he supports the taxation rate f . In that case, it is easy to show that, still assuming t 1 f (< 1), the result turns out to be in contradiction with empirical evidence for a signi…cant part of the population :
@ y it y t ;t @ t 1 0. Second, unlike in our assumption, if individuals could have known from the beginning whether they will be lucky or not, a lucky individual, by being wealthier, would have supported less redistribution. From this perspective, our assumption does not alter the qualitative result at the individual level while making the analysis at the collective level easier.
The majority rule
We now assume that, in a democracy, any policy to be implemented must be supported by a majority 10 . In our model, under the su¢ cient condition max i fa i g 2 a, preferences are single-peaked in t . Thus the median-voter theorem applies. It follows from eq. (9) that the tax rate selected under majority rule can be expressed as
, where a m denotes the median a i . Denote by = a a m an aggregate index of income inequality 12 , and normalize a m = 2 (without loss of generality). Assuming that the distribution of (squared) talents a i is skewed to the right yields 0 (so that the median income is lower than the average income as observed). Denote by s = 2(1+ ) the tax rate selected under majority rule if individuals were driven only by their self-interest, i.e. if ' t = 0. This sel…sh tax rate exhibits the standard Meltzer-Richard e¤ect : as income inequality rises, the median voter is poorer compared with the average, and then supports greater redistribution :
0. However, as noted in the introduction, income inequality is a poor predictor of redistributive policies. Di¤erently, with fair motives, the dynamics of redistribution under majority rule can be expressed as a convex combination of the purely interested and the purely intuitively fair tax rates such that :
given. t provides a measure of the proximity of the redistributive tax to the purely interested level (relatively to the purely fair level). From that perspective, it is worth noting that the proximity of the redistributive tax 10 As put forward by Corneo and Neher (2014) , democracies implement to a large degree the level of redistribution demanded by the median voter. 11 We implicitly assume that an immigrant of the …rst generation cannot vote in his new country.
to the purely interested level increases as income inequality increases,
> 0, and decreases as the concern for fairness increases, (10), such a stable stationary state is as close to the fair tax rate as the concern for fairness ' is high. Reciprocally, by assuming that being exposed to unfairness during youth reduces the concern for fairness, the mechanism we are exploring states also that the concern for fairness increases as the tax rate (Fig. 1) . 13 If considering that 0 is continuously distributed over [0; 1] or 0; f , the event 0 =~ has a probability of zero.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , if at date t = 0 people are socialized in an environment where that is young at date t = 1 is socialized in an environment that is closer to the fair institution than was the previous generation. Hence, by being exposed to less unfairness, their concern for fairness increases and they will support an institution that will be closer to fairness at date t = 2.
This cultural transmission process ends with the implementation of the high redistribution level characterized by the tax rate EU . The redistributive institution and the concern for fairness coevolve and are self-reinforcing such that lim 
Extensions

Endogenous perceptions
To characterize the level of redistribution that would be perceived as socially optimal, studies show that individual merit is an important principle at both the individual and aggregate levels.
As shown by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) for example, the belief that luck rather than e¤ort determines income is a strong predictor of the national level of redistribution. Accordingly, by reducing the relative importance of luck in the income determination, more e¤ort should lead to the perception of an income distribution whose unfairness requires a lower level of redistribution. From that perspective, as redistribution lowers the market return to e¤ort and reduces e¤ort as speci…ed in eq. 6, one would then expect that the level of redistribution perceived as fair under the merit principle increases with the redistributive tax to be such that
However, having endogenous rather than exogenous perceptions does not call into question the capacity of our mechanism to generate multiple stable stationary states. On the one hand, following Proposition 2, if the concern for fairness ' = T f ( ) 2 is su¢ ciently low when the redistributive institution approaches the sel…sh level s , there still exists a stable of GDP at the same date), this nonlinear case does not challenge our mechanism explaining why individuals in high-redistribution countries exhibit a greater concern for fairness than individuals in low-redistribution countries. Indeed, we can see in Figure 2b that the countries characterized by the high levels of redistribution G and F have a quite similar small distance between their e¤ective taxation and the fair one,
the distance T f ( ) 2 re ‡ects the observed unfairness of the redistributive institution. To that extent, the redistributive institution characterized by the low level U S appears less fair,
In terms of our mechanism based on oblique socialization that states that being exposed to unfairness during youth reduces the concern for fairness, it means that the concern for fairness is lower in the low-redistribution country than in the high-redistribution countries : such a speci…cation, it is the endogeneity of the fair tax perception that leads to multiplicity, which is not the case of our mechanism as underlined by the exogenous or linear cases. In addition, without our oblique socialization e¤ect, individuals in high-redistributive countries do not exhibit a greater concern for fairness than do individuals in low-redistributive countries.
From these perspectives, our mechanism appears clearly di¤erent from the one proposed by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) based on the endogeneity of the fair tax 14 .
Heterogenous perceptions
If individual merit appears to be an important principle to characterize the level of redistribution that would be perceived as socially optimal, its content may give rise to interpretation and then be perceived di¤erently from one individual to another. Certainly, e¤ort and hard work are associated with individual merit. Certainly, luck is seen as a unfair component of income. However, as noted by Schokkaert and Truyts (2014) , income di¤erences caused by ability or talent may be seen more or less fair according to whether talent is perceived as re ‡ecting former investments in human capital or as innate and then beyond an individual's control. This ambiguity is revealed by several studies whose …ndings are contradictory. For example, Fong 14 Abstracting from expectations, the tax level perceived socially as fair in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) is
denotes the level of utility perceived as fair for an adult of type i, and u that social concerns with respect to redistribution include both the concern for fairness and a dislike of ine¢ ciency that can be associated with the "greatest aggregate happiness", i.e. the utilitarian concept of social justice most closely associated with Bentham (see Konow, 2003) .
These …ndings suggest that the principle characterized by "everyone should get what they deserve" can con ‡ict with other moral concepts in de…ning a socially just redistribution 15 .
To the extent that the content of merit may be perceived di¤erently from one individual to another and that di¤erent concepts of distributive justice may lead to the de…nition of di¤erent socially just levels of redistribution, it is likely that individuals with similar information about the market outcomes will have di¤erent perceptions of the just level of redistribution in the country. Accordingly, escaping from the assumption that the perception of the fair redistributive tax is unanimously shared in the population, assume that di¤erent perceptions may exist across 15 In recent years, a great deal of literature has showed experimentally for example that con ‡icts between deontological principles (considering that the right to get what one deserves is a principle that should be applied to everyone belongs to a deontological conception of justice) and utilitarianism are a general feature of moral thinking (see Greene, 2008 , to be consistent with the empirical literature.
Conclusion
If it is accepted that humans are driven solely by self-interest, Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that the level of redistribution in a democratic society is increased by inequality in the income distribution. However, this result has only weak support in the data. In this paper, we argue that the failure of the canonical model is due in part to its behavioral assumptions.
Departing from traditional economics, empirical studies and individual surveys show that individuals do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. These studies also show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects their preferences about redistribution. We include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to propose a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through observation and imitation of others'choices in a way that is consistent with oblique socialization. More speci…cally, observing during childhood how adults the model exhibits two stable stationary states U S and EU such that
have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern for fairness when adult or the moral cost of not supporting a fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, and assuming that the perception of the fair level of taxation is exogenous and unanimously shared in the population, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that may account for the huge and persistent di¤erences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a high preference for redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country. These results have been shown to be robust for extended speci…cations of the perception of the fair level of taxation, in particular if they are heterogenous across individuals.
In the speci…cations that we have used, we have …rst considered childhood only as a passive period during which individuals are socialized and internalize cultural practices. However, childhood is also a crucial period during which individuals can actively invest in their human capital through e¤ort at school. Knowing that e¤ort at school depends on the expected return, which is negatively impacted by the future level of redistribution, introducing education explicitly in our model would result in a dynamic of redistribution that is driven not only by history but also by expectations. Second, we have considered socialization only through passive observation and imitation of the society at large (oblique socialization), and not through 
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